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In this chapter, I explore the notion of great power responsibility in the context of international climate 
politics. I do not discuss climate responsibility from a moral or legal theory point of view; on the contrary, 
I examine the way in which notions of climate responsibility are negotiated by agents, especially great 
powers, in secondary institutions (i.e., international organisations and regimes). I argue that climate 
responsibility constitutes an international norm that began to evolve in the late 1960s, was 
institutionalised in the 1990s, and now approaches the stage of assimilation. Its development has been 
shaped by many international events, agents, and political struggles involving discourses of responsibility 
(cf. Falkner 2012; Falkner and Buzan 2017). However, primary institutions of great power management 
and sovereignty, notably the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 
have framed the evolution of climate responsibility as well. In particular, I demonstrate that the rise of 
China to great power status has significantly influenced the historical process of the constitution and 
regulation of climate responsibility. I argue that, in contrast to its traditionally reluctant role in 
international climate negotiations, China recently began to promote climate responsibility as an attribute 
of great power responsibility. China’s changing notions of responsibility reflect the historic 
transformation of the country’s values, identities, and interests, all of which are constrained by the 
interests of other international agents.  
 
In the English School (ES), the most advanced theoretical account of change in primary institutions has 
been provided by Tonny Brems Knudsen, whose “pre-theory of fundamental institutional change” points 
out that international organizations are central to the “reproduction and working [of primary institutions], 
and therefore also to changes in their working” (Knudsen 2013, 18; see also Navari 2016). Knudsen’s 
model, however, does not theorise the way in which agents shape processes of institutional change and 
hence cannot thoroughly explain the evolution of the mentioned international practices and norms (but 
see Knudsen 2016, 103). In response, I suggest that we pay attention to the role of agency in processes 
of institutional change (cf. Navari in this volume; Spandler 2015). In addition to state agency, subnational 
and non-state actors participate in the institutionalisation processes of secondary institutions in many 
ways and are therefore important subjects of change (Clark 2007; Epstein 2008; Falkner 2012). In this 
chapter, however, I deliberately focus on state agency, especially the agency of great powers, whose role 
is decisive in the evolution of international practices. In short, powerful agents seek to advance 
international rules that serve their (domestic) interests and values (Clark 2011; Simpson 2004). 
 
My argument proceeds as follows. First, I outline the relationship between primary and secondary 
institutions and theorising the role of the UNFCCC in the construction of climate responsibility. Second, 
I look at China’s rise and its implication for ideas of great power responsibility. My focus is on 
responsibility as a rule of practice of great power management: I discuss what kind of requirements China 
must fulfil to become an accepted member of the “great power club” and how China has begun to 
perceive climate responsibility as an important attribute of its growing great power responsibility. Lastly, 
I explore the generation and evolution of international norm of climate responsibility. I am especially 
 
 
interested in how the UNFCCC has historically defined and distributed general and special 
responsibilities and how great power management and sovereignty have shaped these processes. In 
addition, I pay particular attention to China’s contribution to the process. 
 
Secondary institutions, responsibility, and institutional change  
 
Inspired by Knudsen (2013; 2016), Navari (2016), Friedner Parrat (2014), and Spandler (2015), I define 
secondary institutions as stable, goal-oriented international bodies intentionally designed by international 
actors to manage and regulate common problems in specific areas of pragmatic issues and to govern 
cooperation according to collectively settled norms and rules, whether legally codified or not. Secondary 
institutions include international organisations and regimes, as well as international rules that have 
incrementally evolved into established practices (cf. Keohane 1989, 3–4). Although secondary 
institutions always mirror power politics and the shared values of international society during a particular 
era, that function does not mean that they are merely arenas for international power struggles. Since 
secondary institutions are deliberately established to respond to global problems, states are usually 
willing to compromise in such institutions in order to agree on viable solutions. Put differently, states’ 
involvement in secondary institutions is motivated not only by self-interested calculations, but also by a 
belief that participating is the right thing to do. At the same time, participation in international 
organizations and regimes is not a “resolution to perform any particular substantive action” (Oakeshott 
1975, 58). As such, though no direct link between participation in secondary institutions and state 
behaviour exists, a state’s identity and interests influence the kind of organisations in which the state will 
take part, as well as what kind of role it is willing or capable to take within those organisations.  
 
As Knudsen (2013, 34) points out, secondary institutions are the “most important frameworks for the 
reproduction and change of fundamental institutions, and thus for the maintenance and development of 
international order and justice”. Therefore, they constitute the primary platform of international politics 
of responsibility, chiefly by offering an important forum in which states and non-state actors can 
negotiate the definition, distribution, and implementation of rights and responsibilities, as well as monitor 
their fulfilment. Nevertheless, those negotiations are shaped and constrained by primary institutions. 
Since international responsibilities are neither given nor static, participants in secondary institutions 
themselves are the ones who negotiate the responsibilities of all participants, the ethical grounds upon 
which they are distributed among participants, and the mechanisms through which they are implemented 
and monitored. Although some responsibilities are formulated as legal obligations in international treaties, 
most state responsibilities are merely uncodified and operate as informal norms.  
 
I propose that secondary institutions, and especially their constitutive documents, are the key forums for 
obtaining empirical data about how primary institutions sustain and organise modern international 
society. They connect primary institutions and everyday politics exercised by state and non-state agents 
in a bilateral relationship. For one, secondary institutions anchor primary institutions in the day-to-day 
workings of international relations. In that sense, I concur with Barry Buzan (2004a; 2014) and Kal Holsti 
(2004) that secondary institutions are largely empirical manifestations of primary institutions. However, 
that view is somewhat oversimplified, for it bypasses agency and interests in general and those of great 
powers in particular. That oversimplification leads to my second point—namely, that secondary 
institutions also anchor changes in everyday politics in primary institutions. Via secondary institutions, 
the domestic practices of powerful states and, moreover, power shifts in international relations can induce 
change in primary institutions. For example, China’s rise might not only shape day-to-day politics of 
secondary institutions, but also gradually transform the constitutive principles of primary institutions. 
 
 
Moreover, non-state actors can shape existing primary institutions and advance the generation of new 
ones, as demonstrated by the cases of international environmental and human rights, via their 
participation in secondary institutions. Secondary institutions therefore function as links between 
international society and world society (Buzan 2004a; Clark 2007; Williams 2014). 
 
Clearly, climate responsibility relates to the interplay between global and domestic practices. Without 
the international sphere, states would not know what climate responsibility means, while without the 
national and local spheres, operationalising the concept would be impossible. Climate responsibility 
cannot be located in any international organisation, though many secondary institutions exist in which 
participants can negotiate climate responsibility or its dimensions. At the same time, the UNFCCC plays 
a more central role in the construction of climate responsibility than any other secondary institution. It 
assembles state and non-state actors, offers a “common reference-point” (Sending and Neumann 2011, 
236) for climate responsibility, and both coordinates and enables international climate practices. It also 
establishes the infrastructure for derivative sub-practices, including those of climate finance and flexible 
market mechanisms. The UNFCCC, however, is not a standalone actor and does not have much, if any, 
power as such. Thus, the power relations among participants and other international practices shape the 
UNFCCC, and power shifts in the UNFCCC, in turn, can shape the constitutive principles of climate 
responsibility over time. Yet, it should also be noted that climate responsibility does not materialise from 
the global framework of the UNFCCC. On the contrary, it has to be implemented as national policy and 
acted upon at the grassroots level. 
 
Practices of great power responsibility  
 
Instead of offering a clear-cut definition of great powers,1 ES literature describes several important 
requirements that a state need to fulfil in order to be and be seen as a great power (e.g., Bull 2002 [1977]; 
Buzan 2004b; Cui and Buzan 2016; Hurrell 2007; Jackson 2000; Jones 2014; Simpson 2004; Wheeler 
2000; Wight 1999 [1946]). In short, the ES maintains that even if a state reaches a certain level of material 
capacity and has a certain national identity, it does not automatically become a great power, but instead 
needs to be recognised and accepted by other recognised great powers. In particular, a great power has 
to be constituted as an accepted member of a so-called “great power club”, the qualifications for which 
change over time—for, due to anarchical nature of international society, rights and responsibilities of 
great powers cannot be formalised or made fully explicit (Bull 2002 [1977], 221).  
 
Since the Congress of Vienna (1814–15), at which Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia 
established the first great power club in ES terms as a so-termed “Holy Alliance”, responsibility has 
constituted the key ideological basis for the joint rule of great powers (Simpson 2004, chap. 4; Clark 
2011, chap. 4). At the Congress of Vienna, the five great powers were “conscious of themselves as 
constituting an institution which was separate from other states and in possession of special 
responsibilities as well as rights vis-à-vis international society” (Brown 2004, 7). According to F. R. 
Bridge and R. Bullen, that status formed an implicit social contract between great powers and smaller 
states, for “just as the great powers claimed special rights for themselves, so the small states claimed that 
the great had special responsibilities for their well-being” (quoted in Bukovansky et al. 2012, 27). 
However, that contract was not written in international law, meaning that great power management 
constituted an informal practice in those days. Later, the League of Nations also gave special status to 
                                                     




great powers but did not form an “institutional/ideological unity” similar to the Concert of Europe 
(Brown 2004, 8). 
 
In 1933, Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy signed the Four Power Pact, which declared them to 
be “conscious of the[ir] special responsibilities” (Bukovansky et al. 2012, 29). In 1943, in reference to 
Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States, British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden insisted 
that “special responsibilities do rest on our three powers” (quoted in Bukovansky et al. 2012, 29). In 
1944, he moreover proposed the formalisation of the special responsibilities of great powers by 
establishing a new world organisation that would “make it possible for them [the Four Powers] to carry 
out the responsibilities which they will have agreed to undertake” and therefore that “they must be 
given . . . a special position in the organisation” (quoted in Bukovansky et al. 2012, 30). In the final 
months of World War II, when “everyone” was talking about responsibility (Bukovansky et al. 2012, 
29–30), US President Franklin D. Roosevelt (1945) wrote, “we have learned in the agony of war that 
great power involves great responsibility”, and President Harry S. Truman (1945) told the US 
Congress—and reiterated it at the UN General Assembly in San Francisco in April 1945—that  
 
While these great states have a special responsibility to enforce the peace, their 
responsibility is based upon the obligations resting upon all states, large and small, not to 
use force in international relations except in the defense of law. The responsibility of the 
great states is to serve and not to dominate the world.  
 
In its contemporary form, the great power club was institutionalised by the establishment of the UN 
Security Council in 1945 (Simpson 2004, chap. 6). Great powers—the United States, the United Soviet 
States of Russia, Great Britain, France, and the Republic of China—were appointed special 
responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations (Article 24), which formalised their “primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security”.2 That responsibility was based 
largely on great powers’ material capabilities, because, according to British Foreign Secretary Eden, “the 
more power and responsibility can be made corresponding, the more likely it is that the machinery will 
be able to fulfil its functions” (quoted in Bukovansky et al. 2012, 31). However, when the Cold War 
broke out soon after the foundation of the United Nations, no collective understanding of the practical 
responsibilities of great powers had been established. During the Cold War, UN Security Council 
membership represented predominantly symbolic status that indicated neither power nor responsibility, 
as illustrated by the Republic of China’s (Taiwan) maintenance of its status as a permanent member of 
the UN Security Council for 20 years after its regime’s defeat on mainland China (Brown 2004, 9). In 
Western international society, the United States took on a “new position of world responsibility” and 
became the “principal protector of the free world” (Truman 1948). Such responsibility, however, was not 
tied to the collective responsibility of the great powers but the global capabilities of the United States as 
a singular hegemonic actor (Brown 2004, 11–13; Clark 2011, chap. 6; Ikenberry 2009, 76–79).  
 
After the end of the Cold War, the idea of great power responsibility was resurrected. In particular, Gareth 
Evans’s (1990) conception of good international citizenship, as well as Francis M. Deng and colleagues’ 
(1996) conception of sovereignty as responsibility, generated a wider debate over ethics and foreign 
policy in the late 1980s and early 1990s. When human rights emerged as a new “standard of civilization” 
(Donnelly 1998), it situated humanitarian intervention and “responsibility to protect” as key attributes of 
                                                     
2 Although China was not regarded as a great power in those times, it acquired a permanent seat in the UN Security Council 
mostly due to its large population and status as a key representative of developing countries.  
 
 
great power responsibility (e.g. Wheeler 2000). At the same time, ideas of environmental security also 
began to develop as a common approach to international security. The UN Security Council (1992) noted 
that “non-military sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields have 
become threats to peace and security”. In the mid-2000s, many “securitizing moves” to promote climate 
change mitigation were taken (Trombetta 2008, 594–595), and since then, the relationship between 
climate change and violent conflicts has been studied widely (e.g., Lee 2009; Mazo 2010; Welzer 2012). 
Those developments generated debate about the UN Security Council’s role in mitigating climate change, 
which, if seen as a threat to international peace and security, can and should be added to the Council’s 
agenda. In 2007, the Council held the first-ever debate on the relationship of climate change, energy, and 
security, although some members, including China, doubted whether the Council was an appropriate 
forum for the discussion (United Nations 2007). Four years later, the UN Security Council (2011) 
adopted its first-ever statement on climate change that expressed concerns over the phenomenon’s 
possible security impacts. In 2013, the Security Council held informal talks on climate change but failed 
to define it as an international security threat due to resistance from China and Russia (Krause–Jackson 
2013). Even though the Council has still not made any concrete decisions on climate change, the fact that 
it has discussed climate security has already upgraded the status of climate change on the global political 
agenda. That development can be regarded as a sign that climate responsibility is becoming an attribute 
of great power responsibility.  
 
Since the beginning of reform era in the late 1970s, China has experienced a profound change in identity 
from an isolated communist state to an emerging great power, which has dramatically changed its notions 
of state responsibility and its role in international society (Buzan 2010; Chen 2009; Foot 2001; Jin 2011; 
Jones 2014; Scott 2010; Xia 2001; Yeophantong 2013). Though a member of the Security Council, only 
after the end of the Cold War did international society begin to regard China as a new potential great 
power. On the one hand, states called for China’s integration into international society (Zheng 1999, 
126–128); on the other, theories of a Chinese threat started to take shape after the incident at Tiananmen 
Square in 1989 as the United States, Japan, and Taiwan speculated whether China was beginning to pose 
a threat to international society (Deng 2006). As China’s economic wealth and international status 
increased significantly during the 1990s, Chinese intellectuals began to debate the country’s international 
role and other countries’ expectations of the nation in that role (Shambaugh 2013; Xia 2001). At the same 
time, the Western world began to worry whether China would comply with established international 
norms, especially those regarding democracy and human rights (cf. Buzan 2010; Shambaugh 2013). 
When human rights began setting criteria for membership in international society, China ended up 
signing two major international human rights conventions in the late 1990s in order to polish its 
international image and legitimise its international status (Foot 2001; Suzuki 2008). Notably, the debate 
over China’s global responsibility heated up when US Deputy Secretary of State Robert B. Zoellick 
introduced the concept of being a responsible stakeholder to international politics in 2005 (Zoellick 2005; 
cf. Commission of the European Communities 2006) and when China surpassed the United States as the 
largest carbon dioxide emitter in the world in 2006. 
 
Since no formal criteria of great power responsibility exist, neither do any clear rules that China has to 
follow in order to be and be recognised as a great power. Due to its hegemonic status in the post-World 
War II era, the United States has succeeded to formulate contemporary social rules of the great power 
club almost entirely by itself (Clark 2011). Since Zoellick’s speech in 2005, the United States has 
maintained responsibility as the central ruler of the great power club (Zoellick 2005; Donilon 2012; 
Steinberg 2009; White House 2009). By contrast, China’s “irresponsibility” can thus be viewed as the 
chief reason that it has not been treated as a social equal or legitimate member of the club (Patrick 2010; 
 
 
Suzuki 2008), which has made China a “frustrated great power” that seeks social recognition in all 
international forums (Suzuki 2008). Although China did not officially comment upon Zoellick’s speech, 
it has since emphasised its peaceful development strategy and persistently portrayed itself as a 
responsible stakeholder in international politics. In particular, China has taken an active role in the United 
Nations and heightened its participation in UN peacekeeping operations (Foot 2014; Suzuki 2008). Since 
Chinese President Xi Jinping took office in March 2013, however, China has begun to define and 
implement its so-called “grand strategy” in a more determinate way than ever before. Notably, it has 
started to construct and promote its own concepts and ideas, including “harmonious world” (和谐世界), 
“the China dream” (中国梦), “the Asia-Pacific dream” (亚太梦), “the new type of major country 
relationship” (新型大国关系), and “the new type of international relations” (新型国际关系), all as 
means to reform international society in a “responsible manner” so that international norms will become 
“less Westernized” and better accommodate Chinese values and interests (cf. Buzan 2010, 29–33). In 
that way, China could come to considerably shape the rules of the great power club over time.  
 
Moreover, China increasingly identifies itself as a great power in world politics. In June 2013, Chinese 
Foreign Minister Wang Yi delivered a rare comprehensive statement of China’s foreign policy titled 
“Exploring the Path of Major-Country Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics” (Wang 2013), and in 
November 2014, President Xi presented the conception of “major-country diplomacy with Chinese 
characteristics” at a high-level foreign policy conference in Beijing (Xinhua 2014). Due to its autocratic 
governance system and strong doctrine of sovereignty, however, China has not fully supported human 
rights and other standards of civilization that the United States promotes as attributes of great power 
responsibility. China’s conception of the new type of great power relationship focuses above all on “core 
interests”, largely in order to persuade the United States to respect China’s sphere of interest in East Asia. 
By contrast, China does not advance common understandings and values that could be translated into 
new notions of great power responsibility in the near future, largely because, despite its rising status, 
China continues to also emphasise itself as a developing country in world politics. Accordingly, it regards 
its national responsibility to promote its domestic core interests such as economic development as its 
primary responsibility on the global stage.  
 
International climate politics offers an interesting case of China’s emerging notions of great power 
responsibility, particularly because China has increasingly identified itself a great power with great 
responsibilities and formulated ambitious climate policies to live up to those responsibilities. At the same 
time, the Chinese government often refers to the size of the country when speaking on the world stage 
about its global responsibilities. As President Xi (2015a) has described that dynamic, “Being a big 
country means shouldering greater responsibilities for regional and world peace and development, as 
opposed to seeking greater monopoly over regional and world affairs”. However, the Chinese concept of 
负责任大国 could also be translated as “responsible great power”, not a “responsible big country”. In 
recent years, China has explicitly called itself a major power in international negotiations on climate 
policy. In September 2014, Special Envoy Zhang Gaoli declared at the UN Climate Summit that 
“responding to climate change is what China needs to do to achieve sustainable development at home as 
well as to fulfil its due international obligation as a responsible major country” (Zhang 2014). Moreover, 
at the 2014 APEC Forum, President Xi (2014) announced that as “its overall national strength grows, 
China will be both capable and willing to provide more public goods for the Asia-Pacific and the world”. 
Although he did not specify what he meant by “public goods”, but clean air is a typical example of goods 
that everyone can consume without decreasing in availability to others. Indeed, a few days later, President 
Xi and US President Barack Obama issued their historic joint statement, in which China announced that 
 
 
it would halt the growth of its carbon emissions by 2030 (White House 2014). The statement sent a strong 
signal to international society that both the United States and China acknowledged their responsibility to 
lead international efforts to tackle climate change. On the one hand, it seems China has indeed made key 
climate commitments in reference to its great power status. Notably, China has published all of the 
important climate policies outlined in joint statements with the United States (White House 2014, 2015, 
2016a, 2016b). In accordance with its “international responsibilities and obligations as a new type of 
major country”, China has also deepened its South–South cooperation and pledged to offer more financial 
and technological assistance to developing countries in order to aid them in meeting their own climate 
objectives (China Daily 2016a). On the other hand, China continues to emphasise its status as a 
developing country and the principle of development first. As a case in point, China’s “Intended 
Nationally Determined Contribution to the UNFFCC” published in June 2015 described China as a 
developing country and made no reference to any great power responsibility.  
 
By all accounts, China played an influential role at the 2015 UN Climate Change Conference in Paris. 
For the first time ever, China’s head of state, not its premier, participated in climate negotiations and 
presented China as both a responsible stakeholder and determined facilitator of international climate 
agreement. After the Paris conference, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei (2015) praised “China’s 
sense of responsibility as a major country in tackling climate change.” Notably, China was among the 
first countries to ratify the Paris Agreement in September 2016, which certainly accelerated the 
willingness of other states to ratify as well. However, in early November 2016, only a few days after the 
Paris Agreement entered into force, climate sceptic Donald Trump was elected US president, which has 
continued to raise global concern over the US commitment to the pact. The Trump administration’s 
reluctance to shoulder climate responsibility could elevate China to a new role of leadership in 
international climate politics. Indeed, it seems that China might be ready to take that position, for after 
Trump’s election, the Chinese climate delegation deputy head convinced the world that China would not 
“change its stance on climate change” despite the potential US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement 
(China Daily 2016b). Moreover, at the World Economic Forum in Davos, President Xi stressed that “all 
signatories should stick to it [the Paris Agreement] instead of walking away from it as this is a 
responsibility we must assume for future generations” (World Economic Forum 2017). In his speech at 
the UN Office in Geneva, President Xi (2017) also sent a strong signal to the world and to President 
Trump in particular about China’s firm commitment to tackle climate change. In contrast to other 
attributes of great power responsibility, including norms related to humanitarian intervention that counter 
the basic values of the party–state (Foot 2001, 17–18), climate responsibility does not hamper China’s 
core national interests. Conversely, it might support them, if not also increase the legitimacy of the party–
state by reducing air pollution, improving energy security, enhancing the state’s international image, and 
promoting low-carbon economic growth.  
 
Great power management and the institutionalisation of climate responsibility 
 
International practices and norms neither emerge from thin air nor derive from any single treaty. 
Although the 1992 Rio Conference marked an important event for the institutionalisation of 
environmental norms, it would be mistaken to assume that the norm of climate responsibility began to 
evolve there. Conversely, resolutions made by the UN Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE) 
in Stockholm in 1972 have largely guided how climate change has been defined, what kind of responses 
have been deemed appropriate, who have been critical actors, and how global responsibilities have been 
allocated, among other issues. At the UNCHE, sovereignty was non-negotiable, though 
environmentalists had expressed their concern over the clash of sovereignty and global environmental 
 
 
problems since the late 1960s. As a result, sovereignty formed the foundation of the definition of state 
environmental responsibility. At the same time, sovereign rights were constrained by a state-centric “no 
harm” principle. Although noteworthy that the United States played a role as leader in the early stages 
of international environmental politics (Falkner 2005, 590), it is similarly worth noting that China, under 
the leadership of Mao Zedong, made substantial contributions to paragraphs 2, 4, and 5 of the Stockholm 
Declaration (Greenfield 1979; Sohn 1973). Those paragraphs not only linked the quality of the 
environment with human well-being and economic development, thereby outlining the foundations for 
the concept of sustainable development, but also managed to express all governments’ general legal 
obligation to protect the environment. As Sohn (1973, 440) points out, it was a “striking accomplishment” 
given that similar suggestions for solidarist general responsibilities of governments had been made 
several times in the early drafting phases to no effect.  
  
The scientific consensus on climate change emerged during the 1970s and 1980s. In the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, a series of non- and intergovernmental conferences focussing on the scientific and political 
dimensions of climate change were sponsored by the United Nations and other inter- and non-
governmental organisations. In 1992, the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) 
in Rio de Janeiro confirmed several emerging environmental norms of international society: the 
mentioned “no harm” principle (Principle 2), the precautionary principle (Principle 15), the polluter pays 
principle (PPP) (Principle 16), the common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) (Principle 7), and 
the principles of sustainable development (Principles 1, 4, 5, 6, and 8). It also formulated the UNFCCC 
with the aim to establish a legal framework to hold certain parties liable for climate-related harm and, in 
turn, to facilitate effective solutions for tackling climate change. Today, the UNFCCC remains the most 
important secondary institution related to climate change. Although negotiated rapidly—in about two 
years—which indicates a universal concern over and willingness to tackle climate change, the speed of 
the process also illustrates that the UNFCCC was not perceived as a powerful regime that would 
somehow limit sovereignty and the national interests of states. Therefore, it is unsurprising that whereas 
the UNFCCC enjoys the nearly universal participation of international society, later negotiations on the 
Kyoto Protocol of 1998 and the post-Kyoto Protocol turned out to be far more complicated and slower 
negotiation processes. 
 
Sovereignty has been the central primary institution to constrain efforts to construct common 
understandings of climate responsibility in the UNFCCC. It has prevented international society from 
advancing solidarist notions of the environmental responsibilities of states and from establishing liability 
rules about environmental harm. The UNFCCC defined climate responsibility in accordance with Rio 
Principles 2 and 7; it underscored sovereignty and the CBDR principle, both of which were preconditions 
for reaching an international agreement with China and other developing countries. CBDR acknowledges 
that developed and developing countries cannot be subjected to the same standards, but that climate 
responsibility has to be tied to their national circumstances and capacities. Despite its relevance to climate 
change, the PPP was not written into the UNFCCC, for, on the one hand, developed countries were 
concerned about the costs of the PPP. On the other, developing countries preferred that CBDR 
emphasised historical responsibility, whereas PPP would have also made poor polluters pay (Bukovansky 
et al. 2012, 128). 
 
It has been difficult to reach consensus on the special climate responsibilities of developed countries. 
Debate within the UNFCCC framework has been characterised by two tensions. The first concerns the 
scope of the emissions reduction commitments of the United States and other industrialised countries. At 
the UNCED, though states acknowledged the necessity of emissions cuts, the United States refused to 
 
 
accept an emissions reduction target. Guided by the CBDR principle, the UNFCCC thus stated that 
developed countries have to take the ‘lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof’, 
though it failed to set any binding requirements for them. Since the United States had ratified the 
UNFCCC in 1992, it accepted the CBDR principle, at least in spirit. Later, the Kyoto Protocol 
operationalised the CBDR principle by committing developed country members to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions, and US President Bill Clinton signed the agreement in 1998. However, his successor, 
President George W. Bush, refused to ratify it because he did not want to sacrifice economic growth. In 
particular, he found the Kyoto Protocol to be unfair because it did not assign special responsibilities to 
major developing emitters such as China and India (Bush 2001; 2002). Evidently, US withdrawal from 
the Kyoto process ended its role as leader in international environmental politics and weakened the scope 
of climate responsibility norms in international society. The second tension concerns developed countries’ 
special responsibility to support the capacity of developing countries to mitigate and adapt to climate 
change, as stated in the CBDR principle. Since the assistance obligation was not called aid but a 
“responsibility”, it marked a “significant step in the development of normative international relations” 
based on the “fact that everyone, including developed countries, will benefit from such transfers which 
cannot therefore be regarded as charity” (Jackson 1996, 185–186). Over the years, states have created 
diverse institutional arrangements to coordinate and implement the special assistance responsibility; 
however, no real progress in climate finance has been made. 
 
Prior to the UNCED, China launched a campaign to elevate itself to the unofficial position of leader of 
developing states in international climate negotiations. In 1991, it organised the Beijing Ministerial 
Conference on Environment and Development, which issued the Beijing Declaration that included all of 
the objectives of China’s environmental diplomacy: sovereignty, opposition to interference in internal 
affairs, the responsibility of developed countries, the development rights of developing countries, foreign 
aid, and technology transfer. At the UNCED, China strictly opposed the proposition that climate 
protection would be a general responsibility of all states. For China, the UNFCCC was indeed a great 
diplomatic success; all of its objectives had been incorporated into the regime, and no responsibility was 
targeted to China or other developing countries. Indeed, China fulfilled its international responsibility by 
attending the conference and by ratifying the UNFCCC, even though until the 2007 UN Climate Change 
Conference in Bali, it refused to shoulder any responsibility for climate change mitigation and urged 
developed countries to take full responsibility for historical reasons. At Bali, China committed to 
implement “measurable, reportable and verifiable” nationally appropriate mitigation actions. Its 
commitment was a remarkable step in the post-Kyoto climate negotiation process, for China had by then 
become the largest carbon emitter in the world, meaning that without its participation, climate change 
mitigation would be difficult, if not impossible. At the 2009 UN Climate Change Conference in 
Copenhagen, however, China underscored its sovereignty, opposed external reviews of its voluntary 
climate actions, and indeed prevented developed countries from setting ambitious emissions reduction 
targets for themselves (Christoff 2010). Consequently, China became a target of harsh international 
criticism at Copenhagen, and its pursuit of a more favourable international image has been an important 
element of its climate policy ever since (Kopra 2012). Since the 2011 UN Climate Change Conference 
in Durban, China has taken a more constructive attitude toward international climate negotiations. 
Although China continues to refuse to commit to legally binding emissions targets at an international 
level, it has issued many ambitious strategies to make major structural changes and reduce emissions in 
energy and the construction, transportation, and agriculture industries, as well as to develop significant 





The UNFCCC has not defined special responsibilities for great powers but all developed countries. In 
practice, however, such apparent inclusiveness does not mean that all developed states are expected to 
shoulder similar responsibilities. For one, small developed countries such as Portugal and Cyprus are not 
under the same pressure as the United States and Great Britain to take action, largely given their different 
material capabilities and national circumstances, which have consistently been key points in the 
negotiations process (Bukovansky et al. 2012, 131). However, another reason is that great powers are 
expected to play a role in leading global governance, meaning that whether climate change is governed 
in the UN Security Council, great powers have a responsibility to lead the global effort to combat climate 
change. Nevertheless, the CBDR principle and other unambitious notions of climate responsibility 
endorsed by the United States have continued to dominate post-Kyoto climate negotiations. For instance, 
the George W. Bush administration pursued the replacement of the CBDR approach with a “mutual-
burden sharing” approach that denied the historical responsibility of developed countries and focussed 
instead on reducing future emissions intensity via technological innovation (Bukovansky et al. 2012, 
144). After the US presidential election of Obama in 2008, hope for greater US climate responsibility 
rose, which President Obama largely fulfilled at the Copenhagen conference when he “renewed” the US 
role of leader in international climate negotiations. Unlike his predecessor’s, Obama’s administration 
acknowledged the special climate responsibilities of the United States based on its historical 
responsibility and material capabilities, as well as took measures to live up to that responsibility (e.g. 
CNN 2009; Obama 2014; 2015). At roughly the same time, China began to formulate wide-ranging 
domestic climate policies and in 2013, in collaboration with the United States, acknowledged the 
importance of US–Chinese cooperation against climate change as a “powerful example that can inspire 
the world” (White House 2013). In September 2014, Obama explicitly linked climate responsibility and 
great power status by saying that the United States and China “have a special responsibility to lead” 
global efforts to tackle climate change because that is “what big nations have to do” (Obama 2014). 
However, those special climate responsibilities of developed countries do not come with corresponding 
special rights or privileges, nor do great powers have any privileges under the UNFCCC. Those reasons 
are likely why the United States, which usually supports multilateral treaties if they contain exemptions, 
failed to ratify the Kyoto Protocol (Chalecki 2009, 152). Flexible mechanisms make it easier as well as 
cheaper for developed countries to fulfil their special responsibilities, but they can hardly be understood 
as privileges. Besides, flexible mechanisms were negotiated three years after the CBDR principle was 
adopted in Rio. 
 
The recognition of great powers’ special climate responsibility has not materialised in international 
climate politics. Both China and the United States have opposed legally binding targets for emissions 
reductions and emphasised nationally determined climate strategies instead. Due to the resistance of the 
US Congress, the United States would not commit to a legal climate obligation at the Paris Conference 
in 2015. Therefore, the Paris Agreement is based on sovereign states’ self-determination and defines 
nothing but that developed countries “should continue taking the lead by undertaking economy-wide 
absolute emission reduction targets” (emphasis added), although earlier drafts had used “shall” instead 
of “should”. The Paris Agreement is thus guided by the CBDR principle though it does not distinguish 
the responsibilities of developed countries from developing ones. The Paris Agreement also does not 
specify a legally binding target for emissions reductions for any state but is based on states’ voluntary, 
nationally determined contributions instead. As such, it creates a common framework for international 
climate responsibility; it notes that developing countries should also make efforts to mitigate climate 
change and are “encouraged to move over time toward economy-wide emission reduction or limitation 




The Paris Agreement also states that developing countries need assistance with implementing national 
climate action plans and that their emissions peaks may manifest more slowly than those of developed 
countries. That formulation was strongly supported by China, which together with the BASIC countries 
(Brazil, South Africa, India, and China) and like-minded developing countries on climate change, 
including Argentina, Bolivia, China, Cuba, El Salvador, Ecuador, Iran, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Malaysia, 
Vietnam, Saudi Arabia, and India, resisted legally binding emission reductions for developing countries. 
Both groups oppose different subcategories between developed and developing countries because such 
categories would obviously harm their interests in international climate negotiations. Nonetheless, China 
no longer focusses only on the historical responsibility of developed countries. In his speech at the Paris 
Climate Change Conference, President Xi (2015b) called for all states to “assume more shared 
responsibilities for win–win outcomes”. For China, which prefers moderate voluntary commitments to 
legal international obligations, the Paris Agreement was an appealing approach to climate responsibility. 
In that way, there is no fear of failure, and China can set relatively unambitious national objectives and 
thereby gain face by exceeding global expectations. 
 
Great Power Climate Responsibles? 
 
Although the norm of climate responsibility has not made international society humanist or ecocentric, 
its emergence nevertheless indicates a profound normative change in international society: that there is 
a collective responsibility to guard the planet from ecological degradation (cf. Falkner 2012; Falkner and 
Buzan 2017). That change has occurred primarily via international regimes, and the role of great power 
management has been critical, for great power action has shaped the idea of climate responsibility at the 
United Nations. Considerable international normative change occurred between the 1960s and early 
1990s when the United States pioneered international environmental politics, whereas hardly any 
progress in international negotiations was made during the 2000s since the United States had withdrawn 
from the Kyoto Protocol. The norm of climate responsibility began to take concrete form only when 
President Obama announced at the Copenhagen Conference that the United States respects its special 
responsibility for climate change, which convinced China to change its traditionally reluctant attitude 
toward international climate negotiations.  
 
Moreover, China’s agency has been crucial in the institutionalisation of climate responsibility. For a long 
time, its conception of climate responsibility was highly retrospective; it focused exclusively on the 
historical responsibility of developed countries and assigned less, if any, responsibility to developing 
countries, including itself. However, as China learned that it has a stake in supporting international action 
and taking domestic measures to tackle climate change, it began to cooperate with the United States on 
climate change and to compile domestic climate strategies in the late 2000s. By the 2015 Paris Climate 
Change Conference, “responsibility” had indeed been internalised into the Chinese discourse. Although 
China has prevented the UN Security Council from taking action on climate change, the norm of climate 
responsibility is now a central element of China’s search for legitimate great power status. Climate 
change offers China not only economic opportunities for clean technologies, but also the rare opportunity 
to make moral claims and prove to the world its great power responsibility. For China, climate 
responsibility is an attractive alternative to liberal political solidarist norms of human rights as a new 
standard of civilization” and a moral basis for great power responsibility. 
 
Nevertheless, neither the United States nor China has agreed to formalise its special responsibility by 
international climate regulation within the UN climate change regime. At the same time, the Paris 
Agreement frames climate responsibility as a general responsibility of all states and does not explicitly 
 
 
mention the CBDR principle. That shift limits the claim that climate responsibility is a necessary great 
power responsibility. However, it should also be noted that climate responsibility has become part of 
great power responsibility as an attribute of the Security Council’s peace functions. Great power 
responsibility for climate change is thus an informal social norm that assumes that, regardless of 
international law, great powers are expected to fulfil their special responsibility, yet primarily to maintain 
international peace and security. Unlike previously, they are now being asked to do so by undertaking 
effective domestic climate actions. From the perspective of climate responsibility, domestic action is thus 
a precondition to be recognised as a legitimate great power. If the Trump administration fails to fulfil 
national climate objectives consummated by the Obama administration, then it will end US great power 
leadership on climate change. At the same time, China’s international rank will increase if it succeeds in 
implementing and enhancing its national climate policies, as pledged by its 13th five-year plan. If it 
succeeds, then international society might also become more willing to recognise China’s mounting great 
power status in other political circles as well. Great powers’ contribution to international organisations, 
as well as their domestic interests and actions, could thus have wider implications for international order 
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